СУБЪЕКТ И ОБЪЕКТ

Субъект и объект

В философии под субъектом разумеется существо, одарённое сознанием и волей. Субъекту противопоставляется объект как внешний предмет, предмет познания и деятельности субъекта. Идеалистическая философия говорит: «Нет объекта без субъекта», т. е. внешний мир не существует вне сознания и независимо от него. Диалектический материализм, наоборот, утверждает, что объект существует независимо от субъекта, что без материального бытия нет и не может быть никакого сознания. В то же время диалектический материализм учит, что субъект, люди не пассивно созерцают объективный мир, а практически воздействуют на него и, изменяя его, вместе с тем изменяются сами. Диалектический материализм показывает взаимосвязь и взаимодействие субъекта и объекта; основой этого взаимодействия является объект.

Subject and Object

Philosophical categories. Subject was initially (e.g., Aristotle) taken to be the repository of certain properties, states and actions, and in that context was identified with the concept of substance. This meaning of the term Subject is still current. But beginning from the 17th century, Subject, like its correlative, Object, were used chiefly in the epistemological sense.

Today, Subject is taken to be an active and cognizant man, endowed with consciousness and will; Object, as that which is given in cognition, or that towards which Subject's cognitive or other activity is directed. The Subject and Object relationship is a problem that is connected with the fundamental question of philosophy, and has, accordingly, been given a different interpretation by materialists and idealists.

Materialists regard Object as existing independently of Subject and take it to be the objective world, and in a narrow sense, the object of cognition. But mechanistic and metaphysical materialists were unable to produce a scientific answer to the problem of the Object and Subject relationship, because they held this to be based only on the action of Object on Subject, with Subject being regarded as something passive and receptive of external influences. Subject was understood to be an individual, whose substance was seen only in his natural origin. Subject remained passive not only in the sphere of cognition but also in practical activity, for the old materialists were incapable of understanding the objective law-governed nature of human activity towards the attainment of subjective aims.

The idealists take the opposite view of this. They deduce the relationship between Subject and Object and the very existence of Object only from the activity of Subject, trying to explain the Subject's active role in cognition on that basis. Subjective idealists take the view that Subject is the unity of the individual's psychic activity; this virtually eliminates Object, for it is held to be nothing but the aggregate of the states of Subject. The objective idealists, notably Hegel, have made some valuable suggestions on the role of practice in the Subject and Object relationship, the dependence of this relationship on history and the social nature of Subject. But because the idealists tended to absolutize the epistemological activity of Subject they drew the conclusion that Object was the result and product of the activity of Subject, who was regarded besides as a purely ideal being or substance.

Dialectical materialism holds that Object exists independently of Subject, but the two are regarded as a unity. Subject himself becomes an Object in another aspect and is, therefore, subject to objective regularities. There is, accordingly, no gulf between Subject and Object in principle. Their interaction is based on man's socio-historical practice, which alone gives a clue to Subject's epistemological activity. This means that man becomes Subject only in history and in society, and is for that reason not an abstract individual, but a social being all of whose capacities and potentialities have been shaped by practice.

Man, being the active force in the interaction between Subject and Object, nevertheless depends on Object in his activity, for the latter sets definite limits to the Subject's freedom of action. This produces the need for cognition of the laws governing Object for the purpose of adapting one's activity to them. The Subject's activity is also objectively conditioned by his requirements and the level of production. Depending on this and also on the level of cognition of the objective laws, man sets himself conscious goals, in the attainment of which both Object and Subject undergo change.

As society develops, subjective factors play a progressively greater part, especially under socialism, where social development is controlled by men, which does not, of course, signify any change in the principles behind the Subject and Object relationship.

Субъект

В языкознании, термин, объединяющий понятия грамматического, логического (коммуникативного, психологического) и семантического. С., которые в классическом случае выражаются подлежащим; например, «Петр весел» («Петр» сочетает признаки грамматического, логического, семантического С.). Расчленение понятия С. вызвано возможным несовпадением грамматической, логической и семантической организации предложения. Грамматический (формальный) С. - подлежащее. Логический С., или Тема, соответствует отправному пункту, основе сообщения, данному. Представители психологического направления говорили в этом случае о психологическом С., имея в виду то представление, которое с самого начала присутствует в сознании автора речи. В некоторых концепциях понятия коммуникативного и логического С. различаются. Под семантическим С. понимается слово, обозначающее носителя признака или производителя (агенса) действия. В предложении «Весело Петру» (ответ на вопрос «Кому весело?») логический С. - «весело», семантический С. - «Петру», грамматический С. отсутствует.

Лит.: Пауль Г., Принципы истории языка, пер. с нем., М., 1960; Панфилов В. 3., Грамматика и логика, М.- Л., 1963; Колшанский Г. В., Логика и структура языка, М., 1965; Матезиус В., О так называемом актуальном членении предложения, в кн: Пражский лингвистический кружок, пер. с чешск., М., 1967; Алисова Т. Б., Очерки синтаксиса итальянского языка, М., 1971; Золотова Г. А., Очерк функционального синтаксиса русского языка, М., 1973.

Н. Д. Арутюнова.